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Introduction
 Malaysia’s politics have long been 
intertwined with conscious attempts to support 
its native peoples, who have been recognized 
as economically disadvantaged. Aboriginal 
tribes, such as the Orang Asli, and indigenous 
Southeast Asian Malay peoples are known 
collectively as the bumiputera (BP). These 
“Sons of the Soil” have tended to live in rural 
areas in both the western mainland peninsular 
region of the country and in the northern 
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak to the 
east. Living largely agricultural lifestyles, the 
BP have suffered economically by comparison 
with later Chinese and Indian ethnic groups, 
who tended to locate in what have become 
the more urban regions of Kuala Lumpur and 
Penang. In contrast to many nations where the 
numbers of original native peoples have fallen 
into the distinct minority, the BP comprise the 
majority at around two-thirds of the nation’s 
population (Sawe).
 These Muslim Malay and indigenous 
peoples led long-suffering lives at the hands 
of numerous colonial powers, including 
Chinese Buddhist and Indian Hindu traders 
and Portuguese and Dutch settlers, and 
culminating with the British, who established 
a branch of the East India Company in Penang 
dating from 1786 (“Malaysia: History”). 
Following Malaysia’s unification and 
emergence as an independent nation in 1957, 
attention to Malay economic deprivation began 
to emerge centered around a political party, the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO). 
Originally founded as a counterinsurgency to 
the rise of communism following the end of 
World War II, the UMNO became the largest 
member party of what would become the 
ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional.
 Recognizing the economic disparities 
experienced by the BP, the federal government 
under Barisan Nasional leadership implemented 
a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1969. Through 
legislated economic subsidies, education 
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scholarships and job training programs, and 
political office appointments, the goal was 
to lift up these disadvantaged groups. Well 
intentioned and initially successful, this set 
of policies, organized on an ethnic basis, has 
become increasingly ineffective in narrowing 
the economic disparities between the rural BP 
and the more urban Chinese and Indian groups 
of Malaysian citizens. In this essay I examine 
the origins, contemporary implications, and 
longer-term concerns regarding BP needs, 
privileges, and realities.
United Malays National Organization 
and New Economic Policy History
 Throughout the colonial period, an 
ethnic-based inequality between the Malay 
people and immigrant Chinese populations 
began to form, with a significant part of urban 
areas populated by the Chinese. With this 
concentration of population came a wealth 
disparity between the ethnic groups—the 
Chinese inhabitants were relatively wealthy 
whereas the Malay people were mostly living 
in poverty. Much of this disparity was the 
direct result of the Chinese locating primarily 
in these urban centers, where there was 
a greater flow of money, while the native 
Malay people were concentrated in poorer, 
rural areas of the country. Along with these 
physical location differences came opportunity 
for entrepreneurship, which led to wealth 
accumulation and a greater ability to build 
capital. (In 2014 the median incomes for rural 
and urban populations were RM3,831 and 
RM6,833, respectively [“Report…”].) When 
Malaysia became an independent nation, this 
economic divide had been well established 
and continued as a source of racially charged 
conflict across the country. By the time the 
1969 national election arrived, this conflict 
had escalated to include protests against the 
ethnic economic divide.
 On May 13, 1969, a procession in support 
of the UMNO was planned to be held outside 
Kuala Lumpur, a primarily Chinese city at the 
time (“May 13, Never Again”). Crowds of Malays 
originating from many of the surrounding 
rural areas gathered for the procession in 
order to support their political party of choice. 
According to government records of the events, 
Chinese residents taunted a group of Malays 
some distance away from the gathering. The 
Malay travelers responded violently and began 
to throw bottles and rocks at the Chinese 
taunters. The incident quickly escalated into 
a full-blown fight between the groups. This 
initial conflict started a chain of events that 
became difficult to stop. Once the massive 
crowds gathering for the UMNO procession 
caught wind of the violence, many Malays 
originally present at the procession traveled 
toward the city. Within the hour, these Malays 
were raiding shops, lighting cars on fire, and 
even committing murders. At least 8 Chinese 
were killed. This initial attack by the Malays 
triggered a further retaliation from prepared 
Chinese organizations, escalating the conflict 
and bringing forth a government-issued 24-
hour curfew. Despite the curfew, further riots 
ensued. When the casualties were counted, 
more than 80 Chinese and Malay had been 
killed. Those from the morning were all 
Chinese, those from the time of the raids and 
retaliation were evenly split between races, 
and those from the curfew period were, once 
again, primarily Chinese. The government 
later released an official statement claiming 
that the incident arose from racial politics, 
without blaming either side. There is some 
evidence, however, that the whole tragedy 
was actually a planned coup d’état with the 
intention of attaining Malay dominance 
(Soong). Nevertheless, the incident left the 
country scarred and indicated the need for 
drastic change.
 In response to this “13 May Incident,” an 
emergency government called the National 
Operations Council formed for a period 
of 2 years in order to develop an array of 
constitutional policies, including the NEP. 
These policies endured once Parliament was 
reestablished in 1971 and are in place as the 
derivative of laws and culture to this day. The 
NEP contributed greatly to the installation 
of special privileges for one ethnic group in 
Malaysia, the BP, thereby creating a distinct 
divide between what is considered the native 
ethnicity and other groups, in particular the 
large Chinese population. As a constitutional 
monarchy, the regulation of these policies was 
overseen by an elected monarch and head of 
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state, known as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or 
the King. The Malaysian constitution, Article 
153, defines these parameters:
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall 
exercise his functions...to safeguard 
the special position of the Malays 
and natives of any of the States of 
Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure 
[them] of such proportion as he may 
deem reasonable of positions in the 
public service...and of scholarships, 
exhibitions and other similar 
educational or training privileges or 
special facilities given or accorded by 
the Federal Government (“Federal 
Constitution”).
 In other words, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong has the absolute ability to implement 
privileges and regulations to help support 
members of the “special position” in this range 
of areas through ill-defined affirmative action. 
This essentially gives a boost to the ethnic 
majority in Malaysia, while members of the 
remaining minority are left academically and 
economically unaided regardless of individual 
socioeconomic status. The resulting laws touch 
on many areas, including education, training 
programs, and political office positions 
(Thillainathan and Cheong). They also include 
requirements for certain companies, including 
foreign companies, to have a minimum 30% 
BP ownership of equity, greater access to 
higher-education preparation courses, BP-
specific governmental mutual funds, housing 
discounts, and a plethora of other advantages 
(Whah). 
 In order to effectively investigate the BP 
special privileges engendered by the NEP, which 
was later replaced by the National Development 
Policy and its subsequent related laws, it is 
important to define what it means to be BP as 
well as the premise behind the implemented 
laws. Because the BP is the population 
receiving significant advantages, there is a 
need for detailed guidelines to determine if 
a Malaysian citizen qualifies as a member of 
this ethnic group, although these guidelines 
seem vague in the Constitution itself. One 
discrepancy that arises from these laws is the 
inconsistency of the definitions depending on 
whether a Malay is born in Peninsular Malaysia 
or in the states of Sabah and Sarawak in 
Borneo. As it stands, in order to be qualified 
as BP born in Peninsular Malaysia, at least one 
of a child’s parents must be a Muslim Malay or 
Orang Asli (“Federal Constitution”); in other 
words, the qualification for these rights is tied 
to Islam. This is important because it implies 
the necessity to follow the Islam religion in 
order to have access to the privileges, despite 
any economic disadvantage that they may 
have. This kind of religious affiliation has 
the potential to create greater tensions when 
considering changing the policies, because 
such efforts may be seen as an attack on 
the religion rather than a purely secular 
development. 
 Meanwhile, in Sabah, a child only must 
be born in the state and have at least one 
native parent to be considered BP. However, a 
child born in Sarawak must have two native 
Sarawak parents. Although there also seems 
to be a notable difference between the number 
of native parents required for qualification 
between Sabah and Sarawak states, the most 
distinct difference between the state laws lies 
in the religious affiliation that comes from 
the peninsular regulations, differing from 
the purely parental requirements in Borneo. 
This indicates that there are both Muslim BP, 
originating primarily from the western part 
of Malaysia, and non-Muslim BP (NMB), who 
typically originate from the Borneo areas of 
Malaysia. In addition to the complications 
arising from significant non-BP populations 
like the Chinese not receiving the same 
privileges despite similar individual income 
levels or education, this religious difference 
within the BP group has the potential to cause 
national tension and political turmoil as certain 
in-groups are able to take greater advantage of 
the privileges than others due to the political 
ties to Islam that are also in place. Borneo, in 
addition, has lower income rates and higher 
rural percentages than most other states in 
Malaysia and, therefore, is in greater need of 
affirmative action laws. Since these states have 
less strict and religiously tied definitions of BP, 
the expectation is that a greater number of 
people would be aided and that improvement of 
economic equality substantial. This, however, 
is not entirely the case.
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Contemporary Implications of the 
New Economic Policy 
 The original implementation of the NEP, 
as well as the subsequent laws, had the primary 
intention of lifting up the BP population as 
a whole, specifically because of the group’s 
significant poverty compared to that of the 
Chinese and Indian populations. At first glance, 
the policies seem to have worked. Over the past 
few decades, Malay people have seen an increase 
in average household income, improvements 
in the tertiary education rate, and an overall 
strengthening of the middle class (“Malaysia: 
30 Years…”). The gap between the Chinese and 
the BP has been narrowed in these respects. 
Nonetheless, notable economic disparities 
between the cultural groups continue to exist. 
 Although the income disparity between 
BP and non-BP has improved over the past 
few decades, this may not be representative of 
the reality of income differences. Compared 
to mean monthly incomes of around RM3,500 
and RM2,000 for Chinese and BP, respectively, 
in 2000, a subsequent 2012 report noted 
incomes averaging around RM5,000 and 
RM3,400 for Chinese and BP, respectively 
(Hishamh). The monthly incomes for the 
Indian population have remained on par with 
the national Malaysian average since the 
1970s; therefore, I focus on the Chinese. These 
changes have indicated an increase in absolute 
levels of economic affluence, but the relative 
mean income difference between the Chinese 
and BP has not significantly changed. Based 
on the rising education and income rates of 
the BP, described previously, this minimal 
amelioration of the Chinese-BP income 
difference stands as a major discrepancy from 
the expected. Considering the intentions of the 
NEP, if there were to be any change, an overall 
decrease in the ratio between Chinese and 
Malay income rates would be expected, which 
is not the case. The way that these results 
occurred can be related to how favoring the 
BP was twisted from its original intention to 
be used in political pandering and business 
advancement. 
 One possible theory implies that 
once the laws were in place, those with the 
proper connections and influence within 
the BP category were able to monopolize the 
advantages provided. Wealthier BP continued 
to gain power and income, at the same time 
securing the education and health options that 
often are bragged about by those referring to 
the NEP’s success. Meanwhile, many more 
impoverished BP have actually had their 
potential for economic growth stifled. The 
consequences of this situation are indicated in 
national statistics for the bottom 40% (B40), 
middle 40% (M40), and top 20% (T20) of 
earners. For Malaysia, the parameters for these 
percentages are a median monthly household 
income of at least RM13,148 for the T20 group; 
RM6,275 for the M40 group; and RM3,000 for 
the B40 as of 2019 (“The T20 …”). These exact 
numbers are dynamic; however, they provide 
an approximation of the earnings spread. The 
BP make up nearly 73% of the B40 and around 
54% the T20, standing as the majority for both. 
These percentages compared to the roughly 62% 
total BP population indicate a disproportionate 
number of BP still in the B40 and too few in the 
T20. From another perspective, when looking 
at the statistics within the BP classification, 
only around 16% of BP are in the T20, 4% less 
than ideal, whereas 45% fall in the B40, 5% 
more than ideal (“Yoursay…”). These numbers 
not only indicate a significant income gap that 
has developed within the BP community but 
also emphasize the persistent prevalence of BP 
economic inequality with regard to income, 
bringing into question the real success of 
the NEP-related policies. At the same time, 
the strong majority of high-earning BP find 
jobs through the government rather than 
through entrepreneurial or other methods 
(“Bumiputera…”). This is likely related to the 
NEP policies that guarantee jobs to the BP 
population and can be easily taken advantage 
of by those with the proper connections. 
There are similar trends of income inequality 
within the Chinese population, such that there 
is a general trend toward increased intra-
ethnic income inequality across the board 
(Bhattacharjee and Ho). Hence, it seems that 
there should not be a focus on ethnic-oriented 
policies but rather some other factors.
 Another persistent instance of inequality 
is between urban and rural populations. 
Generally speaking, those living in an urban 
setting have higher incomes than those in the 
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rural setting. As alluded to previously, a majority 
of BP live in rural communities—64% of these 
rural BP are among the B40. In contrast, only 
33% of BP in the urban setting are in the same 
B40 category (“Bumis...”). Ideally, the percent 
in the B40 is 40% for all subsections; therefore, 
it is apparent that there is significantly less 
wealth in rural communities. Since most BPs 
are rural, it comes as no surprise that the 
average income of BP is lower than that of the 
Chinese, who are more concentrated in urban 
centers, and that this income gap is a product 
of urban versus rural income differences 
rather than direct racial differences. A more 
appropriate way of aiding those with larger need 
is to target those with lower income or in rural 
communities rather than those identifying as a 
certain race. Meanwhile, the current approach 
enables the more fortunate BP to take greater 
advantage of the privileges compared to the BP 
who are more in need.
 The increase in the income gap within 
the BP community, however, is not solely due 
to the monopolization of opportunities by the 
well off. Rather, there has also been a shift in 
motivation. In a keynote speech at the “Congress 
on the Future of Bumiputera and the Nation 
2018,” or KBN 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad emphasized that cash aids and 
handouts only serve to weaken the motivation 
and intellectuality of the BP, in particular, and 
therefore the entirety of the country (Rodzi). 
The claim is that the BP have learned to rely 
on the aid, whether they actually need to or 
not, leading to a lackadaisical approach to their 
own lives. This opens up a new issue stemming 
from the implementation of the special rights 
of the Malay. Further claims have been made 
that as BP secure placement in educational 
institutions that otherwise may have been 
offered to more qualified students, they do not 
necessarily follow through in the quality of 
their acquired skills and education. Similarly, 
even though it may be easier for those 
qualifying to obtain jobs due to the favoritism 
of affirmative action, with less developed skills 
and motivation to competitively succeed, there 
is no maintenance of upward mobility. Instead, 
members of the BP community continue to 
expect government handouts to keep them 
afloat—an unsustainable strategy. At the 
same time, there are accounts stating that 
this is a false impression of the BP, but hiring 
companies under this impression end up 
offering fewer interviews and job opportunities 
to fully qualified BP (Mutum). No matter which 
scenario is true, or even if both have aspects of 
truth to them, the point holds that the policies 
underlying them are faulty and thus ineffective.
 Further complicating the situation, brain 
drain has grown into a substantial issue with 
more than 1 million Malaysian citizens of the 
total current population of around 30 million 
living in foreign lands as of 2011 (Nadaraj). 
Seats in the classroom and places in the 
workforce may be offered to Malays with less 
drive than minority groups, but the latter turn 
to resources outside of Malaysia to secure an 
education and career. A similar situation faces 
those who may not receive job opportunities as 
a result of previous erroneous notions of their 
aptitude. Such emigration eats away at the 
number and quality of Malaysian specialists, 
which can easily affect the well-being of the 
country over time.
 Looking closer at the NEP and its BP 
favoritism, it seems that a majority of positives 
that are pressed to the forefront of public 
information by the government are mostly ways 
of manipulating data in order to make them 
look favorable, particularly to the BP majority 
whose support is needed to win an election. Yes, 
more BP are now receiving tertiary education 
and jobs, but, without the drive to continue to 
work toward their own success, their upward 
mobility remains limited. As a result, they still 
make up a disproportionate majority of the 
B40. As a race-based policy, the fewer numbers 
of BP who were in more advantageous positions 
at the time of the NEP, or managed to reach 
such a place afterwards, have been able to reap 
its rewards to a greater extent. For the whole 
of Malaysia, this means that a select few, well-
connected Malays receive a huge advantage 
while non-Malays and less fortunate BP are 
pushed down. 
 For instance, despite Malaysia managing 
to improve its overall poverty rate to as low 
as .6%, 34% of the indigenous NMB group, 
the Orang Asli, are impoverished. Similarly, 
Sarawak NMB have a poverty rate of 7.3%, 
well above the average. This is partially due 
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to a somewhat flawed analysis of how poverty 
is defined. The official analysis of poverty 
comes from a measure of absolute poverty 
based on the gross household income required 
for essentials, including food and non-food 
items (“Poverty Profile: Executive Summary 
Malaysia”). This absolute measure remains 
in contrast to the rates of relative economic 
inequality, which can be seen through the 
significant earning divide between the T20 and 
the lower wage earners (Teoh), when taking 
into account inflation, migration from rural 
to urban centers, climbing costs of living, and 
ethnic disparities (Bradley). Without proper 
evaluation, these trends will not show up in 
the official statistics, particularly when they 
are released by a government run primarily by 
members of this small, elite group. In other 
words, there is significant economic inequality 
between different BP groups, but this inequality 
is obscured by generalized statistics.
Possibilities Moving Forward
 During the 2018 congress, no real 
accomplishments were made according to 
businessmen attending the conference (Ibrahim 
and Amin), but this may not necessarily be 
true. Although no new legislation was created 
or updated, real attention was brought to the 
possibility of modifying the warped agendas 
that originally stemmed from the NEP decades 
ago. A significant amount of hope for change 
has been instilled in the general population 
regarding these issues. News sources are 
aflame with discussions of reasoning behind 
the flaws in the current BP system, and with 
these discussions arise potential solutions 
and suggestions for the PH to consider. One 
of the more common suggestions revolves 
around stripping the racial connotations that 
are required to benefit from the special rights 
(“The NEP is a Tongkat…”). The original NEP 
had the goal of uplifting the more impoverished 
of the BP population, due to their historically 
inequitable position. By taking an ethnic-
oriented approach instead of one solely based 
on affluence, many of the previously discussed 
issues developed and inadvertently fostered 
racial tensions. Should the new government 
attempt to remodel what the NEP was supposed 
to be by refocusing on poverty levels, it may 
be a benefit to developing greater equality 
between all Malaysians. 
 The biggest barrier to any reform, 
however, is the backlash from threatening the 
livelihood of the BP in any way, whether this 
threat is real or only perceived. Prime Minister 
Mahathir attended the United Nations General 
Assembly in September 2018, pledging to ratify 
all of the core UN human rights policies (“Tun 
Mahathir…”). This commitment was met with 
a great uproar from many Malaysian people, 
especially the Malays, due to a policy dubbed the 
International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD). ICERD 
is aimed at committing participating countries 
to the elimination of racial discrimination, 
with only 14 countries in the entire world 
not having ratified it (Gnanasagaran). Using 
erroneous judgements and rumors about 
the effects of ICERD on Malaysia, opposition 
parties like UMNO managed to rally support for 
an anti-ICERD movement, planning the largest 
demonstration in Malaysian history, scheduled 
for December 8, 2018. The irrational and 
unrealistic fear was that the laws would degrade 
Malay special rights by attacking Article 153 of 
the constitution and possibly even Islam as the 
country’s declared religion. Although this fear 
is not entirely valid, as there are stipulations 
in ICERD that permit these types of laws when 
deemed necessary, support for the anti-ICERD 
movement spread across Malaysia. The new 
government was clearly fazed by the opposition 
backlash, rescinding the ratification of ICERD. 
The planned demonstration turned into a 
celebration instead.
 The ICERD reaction casts doubt on 
Malaysia’s ability to actually proceed with any 
changes to the current special rights of the BP. 
Because a convention with possible exemptions 
for culturally specific policies like those for BP 
led to an extreme reaction, any reformations 
that directly target BP seem at best difficult, if 
not impossible, to execute. With this in mind, 
it is likely necessary that steps should be taken 
to allow some BP populations the ability to 
use certain rights to their advantage, while 
excluding them from utilizing others. In other 
words, since an intra-ethnic income gap is 
evident, restricting upper-class BP from using 
many of the privileges may be helpful. This way, 
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the rights themselves may remain in place but 
political manipulation and string-pulling are 
less likely to occur at the higher income level. 
Meanwhile, poorer rural Malays and other low-
income BP groups would still have access to 
the education and career opportunities that 
may provide them with upward mobility. One 
way that this may be revised is the application 
of means testing, analyzing the income or 
affluence of individuals or households in 
order to determine if they should be receiving 
federal aid. This approach would bypass racial 
biases and their associated political tensions by 
targeting those who truly deserve aid based on 
actual need.
 Nevertheless, no matter what the 
proposed solution is to the persistent economic 
divide in Malaysia, both at the intra-ethnic and 
inter-ethnic levels there likely will need to 
be changes made that involve the alteration 
of the BP privileges. As the ICERD reaction 
exemplified, however, revised regulations 
could lead the opposition to play on the fear 
associated with potential loss of BP privileges 
in order to cause chaos and doubt, even if the 
regulations may not have any notable effect 
on said privileges. Moving forward, it will be 
important for the government to remain open 
and communicative with the public about 
any shift away from current racially oriented 
policies to ones more truly economically 
targeted, if it hopes to avoid further turmoil 
and closed-minded behavior. The public must 
understand clearly and specifically why and 
how any policy changes are implemented, and 
these changes may need to occur slowly rather 
than all at once. Should the political climate 
shift back toward the opposition consisting of 
UMNO and PAS (the Islamic party in Malaysia) 
and reclaim power in the next election or in the 
near future, these kinds of changes are likely 
not possible. 
Conclusion
 Malaysia’s history, filled with racial 
divides and distinct differences in economic 
status, set the scene for the implementation 
of many policies aimed at supporting the BP 
community with the intention of revitalizing 
the country’s equality, but this has not proved 
the case in the long term. Because of the racial 
and religiously skewed nature of the privileges 
associated with this support, the policies have 
not been able to complete the original goals 
in their entirety. Rather than supporting all 
of those in need of government aid, certain 
parts of the population are left in poverty, 
whereas others have been able to unfairly take 
advantage of the political expectations and 
opportunities provided to the BP. In addition, 
the general BP community seems unwilling 
to budge on the idea of changing the laws, 
seeing a threat to their livelihood, even if 
they are not able to take full advantage of 
them in actuality. This uninformed pushback 
is exemplified by the recent denial of ICERD 
out of fear of BP rights being compromised. 
Malaysia is now at the apex of a major turning 
point in its history, and it remains unclear if it 
will be able to effectively change its ethnically 
skewed socioeconomic policies in order to 
create a more equal Malaysia. Its ability to do 
so will be highly dependent on the ability of the 
new government to tactfully drive this change 
with proper education of and communication 
with the public, which has already proved a 
challenge. The question lingers as to whether 
Malaysia will be able to continue toward its 
goal of achieving real equality or fall back into 
old ways.
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